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Throughout much of the Cold War, anti-Sovietism represented the yolk of American 
foreign policy.  Anti-Sovietism colored the vast majority of foreign policy decisions and 
generally overrode all other concerns in cases where American goals conflicted.  In 1977, the 
election of Jimmy Carter represented a transitional moment in American Cold War history in 
which Anti-Sovietism ceased to be alone at the center of foreign policy decisions.  The Carter 
administration, reacting against the calculating realpolitik of Henry Kissinger, hoped to place 
human rights at the center of its foreign policy.  While Carter certainly did not hold any illusions 
about the threat of the Soviet Union, Carter insisted on placing human rights on a higher plane in 
some cases.  His administration resolved that America's friends and enemies alike would be 
subjected to the same high standard of human rights and if they did not meet that standard, the 
Carter administration would adjust American foreign policy accordingly.   
 Ronald Reagan's defeat of Jimmy Carter in the presidential election of 1980, affected a 
significant shift in the U.S. government's new emphasis on human rights.  Reagan submerged 
human rights concerns to the broader struggle against the Soviet Union far more than his 
predecessor.  Reagan, like Carter, utilized human rights policy as a foreign policy tool, but did so 
in a more uneven manner, applying the policy against America's perceived enemies while largely 
ignoring the human rights abuses of American allies.  The American experience in Central 
America from 1977 to 1989 demonstrates this shift in policy between Carter and Reagan.  While 
Carter utilized his human rights policy to aggressively confront dictators in Nicaragua and 
Guatemala, facing considerable resistance in the process, Reagan used the policy only as a 
foreign policy tool with which he could confront American enemies in the struggle against 
Soviet Communism.           
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 Ultimately, this research paper will add to the historiography of Carter and Reagan's 
respective foreign policies in three key ways. First, while a number of historians have analyzed 
the foreign policies of Carter and Reagan, few have done so in such a way as to examine foreign 
policy successes and failures through the lens of human rights.  Due to Carter's close 
identification with his human rights policy, many Carter historians touch on this subject in their 
works.  However, few if any works delve into Carter's human rights policy in Central America, 
specifically, despite the fact that this region represented the ultimate testing ground for Carter's 
policy.  Most works on Carter's human rights policy are global in focus, which disable the reader 
from appreciating some of the domestic complexities of target states that effect the Carter 
administration's implementation of its human rights policy in these states.  While most Carter 
historians writing evaluative histories of Carter's foreign policy touch upon human rights, 
Reagan historians tend to focus on the Reagan Doctrine when discussing Reagan's Central 
American policy, largely ignoring Reagan's efforts to mold Carter's human rights policy to his 
own aims, a key topic in this paper.     
 Second, the historiography of the Carter and Reagan administrations is not sufficiently 
mature because it lacks the historical distance that might better ensure a dispassionate evaluation 
of Carter and Reagan's work.  Much of the historical work on Carter and Reagan reflect 
continuing political divisions.  Many individuals currently writing on the Carter and Reagan 
administrations were part of those administrations, like Robert Kagan, who worked at the State 
Department Bureau of Inter-American Affairs under Reagan and Robert Pastor, who was the 
National Security Adviser on Latin America and the Caribbean under Carter.  By approaching 
the Carter administration’s human rights policy in a detached, unbiased manner this paper 
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confronts a historiography that is too often politicized and unbalanced.  
 Third, the historiographies of Carter and Reagan's respective human rights policies are 
deficient in that they overwhelmingly focuses on the perspective of the United States.  It is 
critical that as a historian of U.S. diplomacy one does not overvalue the impact of American 
power and influence.  The human rights policies of Carter and Reagan did not operate in a 
vacuum, but were effected by individual leaders in target states and the political and economic 
circumstances of those states.  This research paper maintains a constant eye on the perspective of 
the target states, Nicaragua and Guatemala.  This research paper captures the perspective of 
government leaders by delving into their thoughts and feelings regarding the human rights 
policies of the United States.  Furthermore, this research paper aspires to a better understanding 
of those most effected by the violence and instability of Nicaragua and Guatemala, the citizens, 
by relying upon the human rights reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.   
The IACHR is an organization of the OAS that, over the course of the 1970s and 1980s,  
regularly went on fact-seeking missions to document and report what was happening on the 
ground in countries like Nicaragua and Guatemala.  In these three critical ways, this research 
paper will add to the respective historiographies of the Carter and Reagan administrations. 
 
THE CARTER SHIFT 
 Upon his election in 1976, Jimmy Carter sought to re-conceptualize U.S. foreign policy.  
Carter hoped to accomplish this by challenging the traditional Cold War foreign policy outlook 
of his predecessors.  In his memoirs, Carter expresses disapproval of the recent American 
tendency to thoughtlessly support right-wing dictators who maintain an anti-communist line.  
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"Instead of promoting freedom and democratic principles," Carter explains, "our government 
seemed to believe that in any struggle with evil, we could not compete effectively unless we 
played by the same rules or lack of rules as the evildoers."1  To Carter, the Cold War had eroded 
the moral foundation of U.S. foreign policy.  The U.S., a nation that once considered itself a 
“city upon a hill," had turned its back on its moral mission to inspire freedom and democracy 
internationally.   
 The myopic foreign policy outlook of the Cold War era had led Carter's predecessors in 
the White House and Congress to support unsavory authoritarian leaders abroad, so long as those 
leaders adhered to American anti-communism and promised to maintain the stability of non-
leftist governments in their respective countries.  In Carter's view, these were indeed dark days 
for the United States.  Traditional American values had been subverted, not only by a Manichean 
Cold War anti-Sovietism run amok, but also by recent foreign policy crises like the Vietnam War 
and domestic crises like Watergate that cast a long shadow across the nation.  Carter told the 
American people in 1976, “We've lost the spirit of our nation...We're ashamed of what our 
government is as we deal with other nations around the world, and that's got to be changed, and 
I'm going to change it.”2  Carter promised to usher in a new era of U.S. foreign policy, an era in 
which the United States no longer viewed its relationships with other nations through the narrow 
lens of the Cold War.  At the University of Notre Dame on May 22, 1977, he stated, “Being 
confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once 
led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in our fear.”3   
                                                          
1 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, (New York: Bantam Books, 1982),  142-143. 
2 Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 139. 
3 Wilson D. Miscamble, ed.  Go Forth and Do Good:Memorable Notre Dame Commencement Speeches, (Notre 
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The Carter administration's desire to abandon that "inordinate fear of communism" posed one 
key problem for the Carter administration.  Anti-Sovietism served as a unifying principle for 
Carter's predecessors, tying their respective interactions with foreign governments together into 
relatively coherent policies.  If the Carter administration was to move beyond anti-Sovietism, it 
too would need a unifying principle similarly universal in its application, not simply to ensure 
public and Congressional support for administration policy, but also to facilitate foreign policy 
decisions within the administration.4  Human rights became that overarching foreign policy 
theme.  Soon after his inauguration, Carter expressed that human rights represented the "soul" of 
his administration's foreign policy.5              
 Carter and his foreign policy advisers strongly believed in the utility of a comprehensive 
human rights program in the Cold War world.  Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew 
Brzezinski explains in his autobiography, Power and Principle:  
We hoped that in attacking the problems at their most basic level the United 
States would thus become engaged in shaping a world more congenial to our 
values and more compatible with our interest...America would no longer be seen 
as defending the status quo, nor could the Soviet Union continue to pose as the 
champion of greater equity.6 
 
The Carter administration recognized that while the United States was winning the arms race, in 
the battle for soft power, the United States was losing ground across the globe.  Carter and his 
advisers intended to promote human rights abroad and, in the process, create a positive image of 
the United States in the developing world.  In pursuing a universal human rights agenda as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 197.  
4 David Skidmore, Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform, 
(Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996), 90. 
5 Alan L. McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America Since 1945, 
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc, 2006), 79. 
6 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, (New York: 
Farrar Straus Girous, 1983), 123. 
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prominent foreign policy goal and distancing American foreign policy from the more cold and 
calculating realpolitik of its predecessors, the Carter administration was not simply making a 
moral decision, it was making a strategic decision. 
 
DEVELOPING CARTER’S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 
 Though the human rights policy of the United States is accurately linked to Carter, who 
aggressively utilized existing human rights laws and expanded upon those laws, that policy had 
roots in Congressional measures that were undertaken before Carter arrived in Washington.  In 
the aftermath of the Vietnam War and Watergate, Congress undertook a concerted effort to wrest 
power away from the executive branch, exert more control over foreign policy and oversee 
executive behavior.  For some Congressmen like Ed Koch of New York and Tom Harkin of 
Iowa, this extension of Congressional power needed to confront the tendency, which Carter 
hoped to further address upon his election, of the executive to support authoritarian leaders with 
records of human rights violations.  In 1974, Congress enacted the Foreign Assistance Act, 
which required "a cut-off of assistance" for "governments which are consistent violators of 
internationally recognized human rights."7  Section 502B of this Act restricted security assistance 
to human rights violators.  It made the "observance of human rights...a principal goal of U.S. 
foreign policy."8  In 1976, Congress created the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs as an executive agency concerned with the promotion of human rights through foreign 
policy measures.9   
                                                          
7 John Dumbrell, American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), 18.   
8 AID/Washington.  Human Rights/Project and Program Approval.  13 December 1977.  
9 Victor S. Kaufman, “The Bureau of Human Rights During the Carter Administration,” The Historian 61 (1998).  
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 On April 30, 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance discussed the Carter administration’s 
definition of human rights in a speech at the University of Georgia.  Vance explained the three 
dimensions of "human rights": the integrity of the individual, the fulfillment of basic human 
needs and the possession of basic civil and political liberties.10  This ambiguous definition of 
human rights left many Americans uncertain about what Carter's human rights policy would 
entail in its practical application.  Frequently, the administration adopted a "carrot and stick" 
approach, publicly chastising and withdrawing economic and military aid from human rights 
violators while publicly lauding and increasing financial aid to those governments that made 
improvements.11   With the bare basics of the policy laid out early in 1977 and the apparatus with 
which to exercise the policy in place before 1977, the Carter administration was prepared to test 
its newly formulated policy. 
 
IMPLEMENTING CARTER’S POLICY: CENTRAL AMERICA  
Latin America quickly became the testing ground for Carter's human rights policy.  
Carter saw himself as acting against a long tradition of violent American intervention in Latin 
American affairs when he assumed office in 1977.12  The United States had militarily intervened 
in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), the Dominican Republic (1965) and Chile (1973) over the 
preceding twenty-five years.  The administrations of Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon all 
identified stability and anti-Sovietism as the critical foreign policy goals of the United States in 
Latin America.  Cultivating free and just societies in Latin American nations was at best a 
                                                          
10 Cyrus Vance, “Human Rights,” Speech, Athens, Georgia, April 30, 1977. 
11 Smith, Gaddis, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 141. 
12 Smith, Gaddis, Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years, 110. 
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secondary goal.  Carter rejected this tendency.   
 Two countries in Central America, Guatemala and Nicaragua, presented Carter with an 
early opportunity to exercise his human rights policy.  Governments in both countries faced 
frequent accusations of violations of human rights and each was embroiled in a violent civil war.  
In Guatemala, the U.S.-sponsored toppling of Jacobo Árbenz in 1954 had thrust the nation into a 
civil war that lasted for over thirty years.  Árbenz was succeeded by a string of military dictators 
who struggled to gain popular support in a nation torn by economic inequality and protest.  
These dictators derived their power from the Guatemalan military and only held power so long 
as they could maintain the loyalty of the armed forces.  Repressive measures against union 
leaders, students, peasant leaders and indigenous peoples increased substantially after 1966.  The 
civil conflict again reached a new level in the 1970s, when the government conducted violent 
campaigns against the nation's Indian population when that population began to agitate for 
economic and political rights.13  As the nation descended into economic depression in the late 
1970s, revolutionary groups were able to further expand their membership and mobilize against 
the nation's military leaders.14  General Kjell Lauguerud García (President, 1974-1978) and 
General Romeo Lucas García (President, 1978-1982) came under international criticism for their 
heavy-handed approach to dealing with insurrectionist guerrillas (disproportionately of Mayan 
descent) but negative international opinion did not deter their actions.  
 In contrast to Guatemala, Nicaragua was ruled by one family, the Somozas, for over forty 
years (1937-1979).  Nonetheless, Nicaragua shared a great deal in common with Guatemala.  
                                                          
13 John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade and Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America: Global Forces, 
Rebellion and Change, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006), 121. 
14 Walter Lafeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, (New York: WW Norton & 
Company, 1993), 255-258. 
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There, too, the government faced a significant domestic insurgency.  Much like in Guatemala, 
dictatorial rule drew the ire of the nation because it was perceived to be indifferent to the needs 
of the people.  Two events in the 1970s typify Somoza's corruption and account for the 
proliferation of opposition movements against him.  First, in 1972, a devastating earthquake 
leveled the capital city of Managua and claimed the lives of thousands of Nicaraguans.  Money 
poured into Nicaragua from all over the world in order to rebuild Managua; President Richard 
Nixon sent $32 million for reconstruction.15  A great deal of this money was never spent on 
rebuilding efforts, going instead into the pockets of Somoza and his supporters.16  Second, in 
January 1978, Nicaraguans blamed Somoza for the assassination of the Pedro Joaquin Chamorro 
Cardenal, editor of the newspaper La Prensa and critic of the Government of Nicaragua.  These 
events turned the tide of public opinion against Somoza and mobilized a broadly based 
opposition movement against his government.  
 Carter and his administration believed that a grounded human rights policy would benefit 
not just Guatemala and Nicaragua's people, but the governments themselves by improving their 
international image and draining their insurgencies of support.  Both nations had been damaged 
by their international reputation for human rights abuse.  If the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan 
governments improved their records, they could burnish foreign opinion.  Furthermore, insurgent 
leaders would face more difficulty in gaining recruits and public support. In a conversation with 
Minister of Finance Colonel Hugo Tulio Bucaro, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance argued that the 
Guatemalan situation was comparable to the Spanish situation: in Spain, terrorist groups 
attempted to stoke army crackdowns in order to turn public opinion in favor of the insurgents, 
                                                          
15 Ibid, 227-228. 
16 Ibid, 227-228. 
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thus perceived as victims of government repression.17  
 As in the case of Guatemala, the Carter administration believed that improving its human 
rights situation would aid the Nicaraguan government in its fight against leftist insurgents. 
Human rights violations combined with a generally undemocratic political process had much 
more to do with promoting insurgency than any external actor like Cuba or the Soviet Union.  A 
memorandum composed by a member of the U.S. embassy in Guatemala argues that "the 
conditions which have fomented the guerrillas' existence for so many years in Nicaragua...have 
been more a result of frustration with the prospect of achieving changes through peaceful 
democratic processes than a result of Cuban backing of the FSLN."18  The same memorandum 
concludes that "If [the government of Nicaragua] were to constructively discuss possible changes 
and undertake some reform measures...this would change the domestic climate so as to undercut 
support for extremism."  The line of argumentation was very much the same for both Guatemala 
and Nicaragua.  Carter's human rights policy did not necessarily contradict the American Cold 
War imperative to support anti-communist governments.  The goal was not to undermine 
authoritarian governments, but to inspire gradual reform in those governments. 
 The Carter administration first elected to pursue quiet diplomacy with Guatemala and 
Nicaragua, tying U.S. military aid to the requirement that both governments grant an independent 
human rights organization the access that it needed to compile a comprehensive human rights 
report.  When the Guatemalan government refused, the U.S. suspended its security assistance to 
                                                          
17 Cyrus Vance.  Human Rights in Guatemala: Views of Finance Minister Bucaro.  Memorandum.  8 November 
1979.   
18 AmEmbassy Managua.  Your Meeting With Somoza.  10 January 1978.      
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Guatemala.  It did the same to the Somoza government in 1977.19  This refusal set the tone for 
years of tense back-and-forth between the Carter administration and the respective government 
leaders of Guatemala and Nicaragua, who resented every attempt to connect aid to human rights 
progress. 
 
FACING RESISTANCE FROM FOREIGN SOURCES  
Guatemalan leaders were furious at the aggressiveness with which Carter and his 
administration utilized this new policy.  Guatemalan leaders renounced U.S. military assistance 
on the grounds that human rights predicates were interventionist and violated Guatemalan 
domestic affairs.  They were also confused by what they regarded as a significant shift in 
American emphasis. In response to visiting U.S. Congressman Robert Drinan’s criticism that the 
Guatemalan government had an exaggerated fear of communists, who, after all, he explained, 
were people too, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Castillo Valdez pointed out to his guest, “All the 
bad things we learned about Communists, we learned from you Americans.  Now that you have 
changed your minds you will have to give us time to readjust.”20    
 Guatemalan leaders increasingly believed that the Carter administration's new policy had 
been designed to embarrass and undermine Guatemalan leadership.21  On October 2, 1979, 
President Lucas expressed his distaste for Carter's policy.  The American Embassy in Guatemala 
discussed his complaints, “the President considers Guatemala is the target of an unjust 
orchestrated campaign of defamation.  The object of this campaign, he says, is to destabilize 
                                                          
19 Memorandum from Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski dated September 6, 1977.   
20 AmEmbassy Guatemala.  Private Visit of Congressman Drinan.  Memorandum. 23 January 1980.   
21 AmEmbassy Guatemala.  Monthly Report on Political Violence and Human Rights: September 1977.  
Memorandum.  19 October 1977.   
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Guatemala and halt its progress.”22  On August 18, 1980, President Lucas lamented that the U.S. 
government was trying to “strangle” Guatemala.23  Lucas and others began to question American 
support.   
 Guatemalan leadership did not only reject the Carter administration’s human rights policy 
on the grounds that it was interventionist or undermining.  Many in the Guatemalan government 
believed that the strict adherence to human rights norms limited the government’s ability to quell 
the insurgents.  In a 1978 conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Terence Todman, then 
Guatemalan President Laugerud lamented the limitations on his government that this progress 
requires.  The "onerous evidence requirements of the penal code [allowed] many offenders to go 
scot free," Laugerud complained.24  He went on to say that human rights was a "two-way street" 
and Guatemalan officials were victims of insurgent violations as well. 
 In 1980, with the struggle with insurgents worsening and the recent Sandinista victory in 
Nicaragua looming, President Lucas lamented that “he was engaged in a ‘war’ with subversive 
leftist forces which would not follow the rules and there was no possibility of defeating them in a 
“clean and legal manner.”25  He went on to say that while “he needed and wanted official U.S. 
economic and security assistance (particularly the latter) Guatemala could and would have to live 
without it if in order to obtain such assistance he had to follow a course that would deprive him 
of the ability to utilize measures that he believed were the only means to keep the extreme left 
from defeating him.”26 
                                                          
22 AmEmbassy Guatemala.  U.S. Position on Inter-American Bank Loan.  Memorandum.  3 October 1979.  
23 Dreyfuss and Walter H. Nutting.  Emissaries to President Lucas.  18 August 1980.   
24 AmEmbassy Guatemala.  Todman Conversation with President Laugerud, January 23.  Memorandum.  24 January 
1978.   
25 Dreyfuss and Walter H. Nutting.  Emissaries to President Lucas.  18 August 1980.   
26 Dreyfuss and Walter H. Nutting.  Emissaries to President Lucas.  18 August 1980. 
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 In Nicaragua, Somoza echoed many of these complaints regarding Carter's human rights 
policy, particularly the idea that the human rights policy was undermining counter-insurgency 
efforts. Somoza continually blamed the American withdrawal of support and Carter's "excessive 
idealism" for the spreading insurgency in Nicaragua.27  On February 22, Somoza communicated 
to an American ambassador that he wanted that ambassador to relay to Washington that the 
United States was going too far with its human rights campaign.28  "[The insurgents] would 
always be complaining until the U.S. stopped applying pressure.”29  On May 8, 1978, Somoza 
again complained that he was not receiving sufficient American support in his struggle for power 
with the Sandinistas.  He explained, “The U.S.G…cannot continue to play ‘this cowardly game.’  
The U.S.G has made its point on human rights…and now it was time to ‘mend our fence…’”30    
At this point in time, under fire from a number of angles in his own country, Somoza was eager 
for public support from the U.S. government, support that, traditionally, he likely would have 
gotten.  In September of 1978, Somoza expressed hope that the U.S. “was aware that its human 
rights policy had encouraged misperceptions by the opposition regarding his weakness."   
 Unlike the Guatemalan leadership, Somoza went beyond simply complaining 
about American posture toward his government.  Somoza threatened the Carter 
administration with Congressional pressure.  On May 19, 1978, Somoza “continued to 
insist that the U.S.G more actively support the GON and pointedly referred to his 
influential ‘friends’ in Congress who would embarrass the administration if such support 
                                                          
27 Solaún, Mauricio.  Demarche to President Somoza.  8 February 1978.   
28 AmEmbassy Managua.  Amb Conversation With Somoza: May 8.  10 May 1978. 
29 AmEmbassy Managua.  Meeting With Somoza.  23 February 1978.      
30 AmEmbassy Managua.  Amb Conversation With Somoza: May 8.  10 May 1978.       
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was not given.”31  American ambassador Mauricio Solaun recalled a meeting with a 
desperate Somoza in May of 1978 in which Somoza excused himself to take a phone call.  
Upon returning, Somoza indicated to American diplomats that the phone call was from an 
American who asked Somoza to contact "A U.S. politician who has the influence to get 
Nicaragua off the hotspot in the U.S. Senate."32  Somoza went on to say that he knew 
many Congressmen and would embarrass the Carter administration unless it decided to 
stop "picking" on him.  Somoza believed that, without executive leadership, the U.S. 
human rights policy was utterly impotent.  
 
FACING RESISTANCE FROM DOMESTIC SOURCES  
The Carter administration had to deal with domestic resistance to the human 
rights policy as well.  In the case of Nicaragua in particular, the Carter administration 
faced considerable Congressional resistance.  An examination of Congressional letters to 
the Carter suggests that Carter was repeatedly attacked from both sides of the aisle, 
though the attacks from the right were more frequent.   
 From the right, a number of Congressional leaders criticized the Carter administration's 
lack of support for the Somoza government.  On June 29, 1978, Representative John Murphy (a 
close personal friend to Somoza) wrote to Carter expressing “Your human rights program has 
caused many to view our foreign policy as 'slapping our friends and kissing our enemies.'  
Particularly in Nicaragua, 'Human Rights' does not include the “right” to riot, kill and destroy 
                                                          
31 Solaún, Mauricio.  Conversation with Somoza: May 19.  22 May 1978.        
32 Solaún, Mauricio.  Conversation with Somoza: May 19.  22 May 1978.       
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with the aim of establishing a totalitarian Marxist state.”33  Murphy further argued that the 
human rights record of the Sandinistas was worse than Somoza's.  Three months later, 
Representatives John Murphy and Charles Wilson sent Carter another letter in which they urged 
him to support Somoza before the Sandinistas toppled his government.  In the letter, Murphy 
complained of Carter's "misguided application" of policies, "particularly regarding 
unsubstantiated and erroneous allegations against the government of Nicaragua."34  This letter 
was signed by over 75 U.S. Congressional Representatives.  Ultimately, the criticisms of Murphy 
and other conservative Congressmen foreshadowed the criticisms of the Reagan administration.  
Carter's human rights policy did not have the unifying effect that he had hoped. 
 Bureaucratic resistance within the executive branch further constrained Carter's human 
rights policy.  Many in the Department of Defense and the Critical Intelligence Agency 
attributed the problems the United States faced in Central America (the Nicaraguan revolution, 
insurgency in Guatemala and El Salvador) to an overambitious human rights policy.35  CIA 
documents from the era suggest that while the Carter administration was prepared to distance 
itself from the traditional Cold War outlook of its predecessors, the CIA was not.  In fact, in 
1977, the CIA believed that the “current impasse between Washington and much of Latin 
America over the human rights issue can only encourage Moscow...as long as the U.S. fails to 
stabilize its own relationship with the Latins, Moscow will be able to make inroads on the still-
preponderant U.S. influence in the area.”36   
 The recent loss of Cuba to the Soviets and the success of Cuba in disassociating itself 
                                                          
33 Letter from Representative John Murphy et al to Jimmy Carter dated June 29, 1979.   
34 Letter from Representative John Murphy et al to Jimmy Carter dated September 22, 1978.   
35 Robert Pastor.  DR On Mini-SCC.  Memorandum.  13 February 1980.   
36 Central Intelligence Agency. Soviet Interest in Latin America.  April 1977.   
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from the United States without losing its independence gave inspiration to leftists in Latin 
America, the CIA theorized; the Soviet Union represented an alternative to the domineering 
hegemon to the North with the long legacy of unwanted intervention.  The CIA even suggested 
that Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, having rejected U.S. military 
assistance "in protest of Washington's 'interference in internal affairs'" might turn to the Soviet 
Union for arms.37    The CIA's peddling of this unlikely scenario demonstrates how adamant 
certain elements of the bureaucracy were in their rejection of Carter's policy; perhaps if these 
individuals could scare Carter administration officials with ideas of increased Soviet influence in 
Latin America, Carter would abandon the policy.  These critics were not eager to help the Carter 
administration further its human rights policy in Central America.   
 The Carter administration was not only being criticized by certain elements of the CIA 
and Department of Defense, it was also being undermined by various elements in the State 
Department.  In a letter dated July 1, 1977, Representative Ed Koch, a supporter of Jimmy 
Carter's human rights policy warned him that his "determination to emphasize human rights as a 
major component in U.S. foreign policy is being badly undercut by certain segments of the State 
Department.38  Koch then relays to Carter that certain elements of the State Department had 
covertly supported the re-implementation of military aid to Somoza.   
 
REVOLUTION: A COMMITMENT TO CHANGE PUT TO THE TEST  
Though Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress and bureaucrats 
throughout the executive branch pushed Carter to support Somoza against the socialist 
                                                          
37 Central Intelligence Agency. Soviet Interest in Latin America.  April 1977.   
38 Letter from Representative Ed Koch to Jimmy Carter dated July 1, 1977.   
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Sandinistas, Carter held firm.  Carter remained committed to his human rights policy, but he also 
recognized that the Somoza regime was nearing its end.  Carter's reputation for upholding human 
rights as the main tenet of his foreign policy would be irreparably damaged if he subverted the 
will of the Nicaraguan people and propped up the internationally despised Somoza government 
when it was destined to fall.  
 Nevertheless, with all of its talk of turning its attention away from the traditional 
Manichean Cold War outlook, the Carter administration demonstrated concern with the rise of 
the FSLN in Nicaragua.  The Carter administration scoured Nicaragua throughout 1978 and 1979  
for a moderate leadership that might overtake Somoza and not yield to leftist radicals.  American 
mediation was seen as one way the U.S. could prevent radical takeover.39  In those mediation 
efforts, the Carter administration supported moderate elements of Nicaraguan society, elements 
that feared that if quick action was not taken to mediate the Nicaraguan crisis, Nicaragua would 
fall into anarchy, civil war and may ultimately lead to communist takeover, or perhaps worse, 
harsher Somoza rule.40     In 1979, the Carter administration explained, "Our preferred outcome is 
to see a moderate transitional government succeed General Somoza...Our goal should be to try to 
isolate [the Sandinistas] and to minimize and gradually reduce their influence.41  Thus, the Carter 
administration sought to distance itself from the Somoza dynasty while at the same time 
preventing the Sandinistas from seizing governmental control.  
 When the Sandinistas did come to power in 1979, however, the Carter administration 
decided to work with them in an attempt to prevent their being pulled any further into the Soviet-
                                                          
39 Memorandum from Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis to Robert Pastor 
dated December 24, 1978.   
40 From American Embassy in Managua to Cyrus Vance date unknown (between September 1-12, 1978).  
41 Agenda for SCC Meeting dated September 18, 1978.   
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Cuban orbit. Initially, the administration demonstrated a belief that the Sandinista movement was 
broad based and open to democracy and capitalism.  As the Carter  administration told Congress 
in 1972,  
The broad outlines of “Sandinismo"...includes a commitment to a democratic 
form, a compassionate attitude toward its enemies, defense of human rights, 
respect for private property, a commitment to allow the private sector to be part of 
a  mixed economy, a commitment to freedom of expression and of the press and, 
in foreign [policy], a desire to have good relations with all countries while 
pursuing a non-aligned posture.42 
 
Perhaps this was the view of an administration that had come under considerable fire for losing 
Nicaragua to the communists.  Indeed, the Carter administration scrambled to mediate the 
Nicaraguan crisis in order to empower a more moderate element.  Nevertheless, the Carter 
administration had a much more benign view of the Sandinistas than the Reagan administration 
would ultimately have. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the Sandinista takeover, the Carter administration remained 
optimistic that the Sandinistas had not undertaken a campaign of bloodletting that might 
exacerbate an already terrible human rights situation in Nicaragua.  Indeed, the Carter 
administration’s evaluation of post-revolution Nicaragua was relatively positive.  The 
administration painted a portrait of a government eager to right the wrongs of the previous 
government.  The Carter administration was impressed by the commitment to human rights that 
the Sandinistas demonstrated in the first months after their takeover.  Not only did the 
Sandinistas invite the IACHR into Nicaragua, as Somoza refused to do in his final years in 
office, but they worked with the U.S. on human rights issues in the OAS.43  The Nicaraguans 
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appreciated the U.S. human rights policy.  As reported in 1980, “Junta member Arturo Cruz 
called me this morning to indicate ‘how impressed all members of his gov’t are that the U.S.G 
took such firm action in El Salvador.’  He said it is convincing evidence that the U.S.G, unlike 
the ‘other block,’ acts on the basis of principle and takes human rights seriously.”44  Perhaps 
these were the words of a government that did not wish to arouse American anger while they 
were still trying to set the foundations for a new Nicaraguan regime, but exchanges between the 
two governments seemed genuinely cordial at the outset. 
 As Sandinista ties to the Soviet and Cuban efforts to spread communist revolution in El 
Salvador became clear to the Carter administration, mild admiration turned to distrust.  The 
Carter administration realized that steps had to be taken to prevent the spread of revolution in 
Central America and stem any Soviet attempt to take a foothold in Nicaragua, but officials were 
uncertain what to do given the positive international image of the new Sandinista regime that so 
bravely toppled the dictatorial Somoza.  An American embassy memorandum discussed the 
difficulty of American intervention: "I do not think our aim should be punish the Nicaraguans, 
though that may be necessary, because they still have much sympathy around the hemisphere 
and in Europe."45  Having run out of time in office, the Carter administration left office under 
harsh criticisms that it had lost Nicaragua to the communists.   
 
CONCLUSIONS ON CARTER’S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 
 Upon Carter's inauguration in 1977, the Carter administration undertook the revamping of 
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44 AmEmbassy Managua.  GRN Impressed by U.S.G Decision in Suspending Aid to El Salvador.  6 December 1980.   
45 AmEmbassy San Jose.  Interventionist Activities in Salvador.  14 January 1981.    
  
20 
 
American foreign policy, first by turning away from the traditional Cold War outlook that had 
marked the foreign policies of Carter's predecessors and second by instituting a comprehensive 
human rights policy unlike any previously known in Washington.  The administration conducted 
this policy enthusiastically, eager to prove that anti-Sovietism need not be the defining 
characteristic of American foreign policy.  Instead, human rights could represent the yolk of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
 The Carter administration likely did not expect the degree of resistance that this policy 
ultimately met in Washington and abroad.  Foreign leaders resisted this policy, some of whom 
renounced American aid tied to human rights progress.  This refusal to comply limited the ability 
of the policy to affect positive change in target nations.  The policy also led to chilled American 
relations with a number of Latin American nations including Guatemala and Somoza-led 
Nicaragua.  Resistance in Washington further demonstrated the untenable nature of the policy; 
while the Carter administration was ready to move beyond the anti-Sovietism of the Cold War, 
bureaucrats and Congressman that had been entrenched in Washington were not.   
 Ultimately, Carter stuck to the policy, though it is questionable if he would have done so 
in Nicaragua if the relaxation of the policy could have perpetuated Somoza's rule in Nicaragua 
and prevented the rise of the Sandinista government.  By 1978, it was clear to the Carter 
administration that nothing short of American military intervention would prevent the fall of 
Somoza and the Carter administration would never make such a commitment in the aftermath of 
the Vietnam War.  Nevertheless, in the latter years of the administration, the Carter 
administration's distrust of the Sandinista rebels and their fear of possible Soviet intervention in 
Latin America indicate that the administration was not as divorced from the anti-Sovietism of 
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their predecessors as they thought they were.  
 
THE REAGAN CRITIQUE OF CARTER’S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY  
Jeane Kirkpatrick's criticisms of Carter's human rights policy in her article, "Dictatorships 
and Double Standards," proved especially influential in the Reagan administration and Reagan 
ultimately fashioned his criticisms of Carter's human rights policy in Kirkpatrick's terms.46  In 
the article, Kirkpatrick drew the distinction between traditional "authoritarian" governments and 
"totalitarian" governments.47  Kirkpatrick criticized Carter for using his human rights policy to 
harass innocuous "authoritarian" regimes, like that of Somoza, which safeguarded traditional 
culture.  Carter should have used his human rights policy against "totalitarian" regimes like 
Sandinista- led Nicaragua because totalitarian regimes, "claim jurisdiction over the whole life of 
the society and make demands for change that so violate internalized values and habits..."48    
During his campaign for election in 1980, Reagan echoed Kirkpatrick's criticisms that Carter's 
divisive human rights policy rewarded America's totalitarian enemies and punished its 
authoritarian allies.49   
 While Reagan's first moves in office suggested a hostility to human rights, Reagan did 
not completely abandon the human rights imperative of his predecessor.50  Indeed, he seized on 
the Carter administration's effort to imbue American foreign policy with American values. 
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Reagan altered Carter's human right policy in two significant ways.  First, the Reagan 
administration did not have as broad a view of human rights and tended to focus its attention 
more on democratization, with a special emphasis on free elections, and focused less on political 
violence.  Second, while the Carter administration made human rights the focal point of its 
foreign policy, the Reagan administration submerged human rights concerns to the 
administration's greater anti-Sovietism.   
 Whereas Carter attempted to distance himself from the traditional Cold War outlook that 
pitted communists against anti-communists in a moral struggle, Reagan embraced that 
worldview.  In 1981, the Reagan administration brought to the White House a highly charged 
ideological conception of the world, one that viewed every conflict in the world in the context of 
the U.S.-Soviet struggle. For instance, Carter initially identified the Nicaraguan revolution as a 
distinctly Nicaraguan phenomenon, the result of internal processes within that nation and not of 
foreign intervention.  Reagan attributed unrest in the developing world to Soviet intervention.  
Reagan explained, "The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on...if they weren't 
engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."51  If the Soviet 
Union was primarily responsible, its surrogates were also culpable for spreading leftist 
extremism. 
 
REAGAN’S NICARAGUA: UNEVEN APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY  
In Latin America, Reagan identified Cuba and Nicaragua as Soviet surrogates.  In his 
memoirs, Reagan suggests that Nicaragua was not only supporting the overthrow of the 
                                                          
51 Leogrande, 53. 
  
23 
 
Salvadoran government, but also the overthrow of the governments of Honduras, Guatemala and 
Costa Rica.52  Consequently, Nicaragua became one of the first victims of the "Reagan 
Doctrine," Reagan's policy to rollback communism by supporting anti-communist resistance 
movements. Between 1981 and 1989, the Reagan administration funneled tens of millions of 
dollars to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, often circumventing Congressional control to do so.53   
 While Reagan funded the Contra rebels, he also undertook a public campaign to 
undermine the Sandinista regime which relied to a large extent upon rhetoric steeped in human 
rights ideals.  Shortly after Reagan’s election, he began to step up verbal attacks on the 
Sandinistas, citing their poor human rights record as evidence that their totalitarian dictatorship 
needed to be confronted.  The Sandinistas were "brutal" and "cruel" and theirs was a “communist 
totalitarian state” without “a decent leg to stand on.”54  Furthermore, the Sandinistas were 
masterful manipulators of public opinion who had deceived many of those in Congress who 
opposed the Contra war.55 
 While Reagan critiqued the Sandinistas on their human rights abuses, he remained silent 
on the human rights violations of the Contra rebels that his administration funded and the CIA 
trained.  To some degree, the CIA was complicit in Contra violations of human rights.  One 
disclosed manual that the CIA had provided to the Contra for training purposes, was titled, 
“Psychological Operations In Guerrilla Warfare.”  It stated: “it is possible to neutralize carefully 
selected and planed targets, such as judges, police and state officials. It is absolutely necessary to 
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gather together the population affected so that they will take part in the act.”56   
 While the Contras perpetrated human rights violations, the Reagan administration 
conveyed a very different portrait of the Contra rebels.  Reagan's "Office of Public 
Diplomacy"attempted to disseminate to the public the idea that Nicaragua's Contra rebels with 
analogous to America's revolutionary freedom fighters.  Reagan himself made reference to this 
intimate connection in a speech he made on March 1, 1985, in which he asserted that the 
Contras, the anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua, were the “moral equivalent of America’s 
Founding Fathers and the brave men and women of the French resistance.”57  In Reagan's view, 
the Contras were not counterrevolutionaries nor were they associated with the Somoza regime. 
Instead, they were champions of the revolution who had grown tired of the "broken promises" of 
the Sandinistas.58   
 The fact that the Reagan administration was criticizing Sandinista human rights violations 
while supporting the violent Contras was not lost on Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega.  
Ortega, speaking about a bomb explosion that occurred at the Managua Airport, accused the  
U.S. of standing behind such violence.  The American embassy in Managua paraphrased some of 
Ortega’s criticisms of U.S. policy, “terrorist attacks were being carried out by the same elements 
who had brutally violated Nicaraguan human rights under Somoza.  The [United States 
government] was complaining of [Nicaraguan government] human rights violations while 
supporting terrorism itself.”59 
                                                          
56 Burns, 58. 
57 Mark P. Lagon, The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War’s Last Chapter, (Westport, 
CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 99. 
58 United States Department of State.  Miconceptions About U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua.  September 1984.   
59 AmEmbassy Managua.  Daniel Ortega Speech.  20 February 1982.            
  
25 
 
 The Sandinista record on human rights, though not unblemished, was better than the 
Reagan administration admitted.  Indeed, the Sandinistas made significant strides in human 
rights from their predecessors in the Somoza government.  An IACHR report in 1981, standing 
in contrast to the Commission's 1978 report, concluded that the Sandinistas had "assumed a 
commitment to respect human rights" and with regard to economic and social rights, the 
Nicaraguan government "[had] made major efforts toward the reconstruction of the country and 
the restructuring of social and economic conditions in Nicaragua, in order to implement those 
rights."60  Certainly, these laudatory notes were tempered by criticisms that Sandinista rhetoric 
did not always match the reality of Sandinista actions, but the improvement from the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights report of 1978 was significant.  By 1982, Nicaragua's 
human rights situation began to steadily deteriorate when the Sandinistas decreed a state of 
emergency.  American support of the Contra rebels negatively effected Nicaragua's human rights 
situation by prompting the government to crack down on perceived opponents.  By 1982, 
Nicaragua's human rights situation began to deteriorate significantly when the government 
declared a State of Emergency which would last until 1988.61  During those years, the 
Sandinistas repressed political opponents and instituted severe press censorship.62   
 
REAGAN IN GUATEMALA: ANTI-COMMUNISM PREVAILS  
While the Reagan administration demonstrated interest in the progress of human rights in 
Sandinista-led Nicaragua, it was relatively quiet when it came to the abuses of the Government 
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of Guatemala which represented a significant divergence from the Carter administration.  An 
examination of U.S.-Guatemala documents from the National Security Archives, reveals a shift 
in emphasis away from the Carter human rights outlook under Reagan.   Human rights do not 
cease to be a talking point, but it clearly begins to take a more secondary role, with Guatemala's 
leftist insurgency becoming much more central. 
 Less than two months after Reagan's inauguration, Ambassador Melvin E. Sinn, 
appointed by Carter in August of 1980, sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig which demonstrates this shift in foreign policy outlook.  It is unclear whether Sinn was a 
critic of Carter’s human rights policy who simply seized the opportunity to affect a revamped 
U.S.-Guatemalan policy or whether Sinn hoped to keep his job as the Ambassador of Guatemala 
under Reagan. In either case, the message is clear: 
On balance, the H.R. reports have worked against our national interests in 
Guatemala.  They have won us few friends, but have contributed to the 
development of a mentality which has limited our access and, perforce, our 
influence with governing sectors…The reports must be counted, at minimum, as 
an irrelevance if not a failure.63    
 
Underlying early Reagan memorandums on Carter’s human rights policy was the idea that the  
 
United States had a very limited ability to affect positive change in foreign countries; human  
 
rights improvement had to come from within those nations. 
 
 The day after this memorandum was sent to Secretary of State Haig, on March 3, 1981, 
the Department of State compiled another report titled, “U.S. Strategy Toward Guatemala.”  
Here, too, human rights as the central emphasis of U.S. policy toward Guatemala was pushed 
aside.  The Reagan administration was focused upon a different problem, “How can we influence 
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the current GOG to conduct itself in a way that will permit it to defeat the Cuban supported 
Marxist insurgency and to become a keystone for regional stability?”64  The aim of the Reagan 
administration was to facilitate the Guatemalan government’s counter-insurgency campaigns, not 
to improve that government's record of human rights.  In a critique of Carter’s human rights 
policy, the report casts doubt on Carter's evaluation of Guatemalan human rights violations by 
arguing that during the Carter administration "we chose to treat the GOG as if it were a gross and 
consistent human rights violator.65  The report goes on to argue that Carter's human rights policy 
was utterly impotent in affecting positive change in Guatemala.   
 Beyond being merely impotent, Carter's policy exacerbated the Guatemalan repression 
and the Guatemalan insurgency, “a plausible case can be made that an important contributing 
factor to the increase in government repression was the paranoia of GOG leaders with regards to 
the intentions of a U.S. administration perceived to have grown hostile, or, at best, indifferent.”66  
Guatemalan leaders welcomed an administration that did not emphasize human rights and that 
U.S.-Guatemalan relations would "improve immeasurably."67  The CIA concurred, adding that 
the Reagan policy would assist the United States at keeping Soviet influence in Latin America at 
bay.68  In May of 1981, Secretary of State Haig sent General Vernon Walters to meet with 
Guatemalan leaders and explain the new emphasis of the United States.  During that meeting, 
Walters relayed that “The Secretary recognizes that your government is engaged in a struggle for 
survival with externally supported Marxist guerrillas.  We want to help you win that struggle.  
                                                          
64 Department of State.  U.S. Strategy Toward Guatemala.  3 March 1981.      
65 Emphasis added. 
66 Department of State.  U.S. Strategy Toward Guatemala.  3 March 1981.      
67 Department of State.  U.S. Strategy Toward Guatemala.  3 March 1981.     
68 Central Intelligence Agency.  The Guatemalan Insurgency: Near-Term Prospects.  1 September 1983. 
  
28 
 
The Secretary has sent me to see if we can work out a way to do that.”69     
 
GUATEMALA: DEALING WITH RESISTANCE 
The Reagan administration recognized that Carter's human rights policy resonated with 
portions of the American public and U.S. Congress.  Secretary Haig noted in April of 1981, “the 
high level of political violence in which the GOG is involved causes us internal political and 
legal problems which impede our ability to maintain the level of military cooperation we would 
wish.”70  Haig then concluded, “Department believes our first gesture could not include the sale 
of helicopter spares or any other [Foreign Military Sales] or Munitions List items without 
provoking serious U.S. public and Congressional criticism of the Administration.”   
 Aware of possible Congressional oversight, the Reagan administration resolved to 
approve some foreign military sales if the Guatemalan government gave the U.S. assurances that 
it would make an effort to quell political violence, assurances that might appease Congressional 
opponents.71  The administration did not require concrete progress as Carter often did, but only 
assurances.  The Reagan administration also tried to find loopholes in the definition of military 
materials, “we are requesting that the commerce department take trucks and jeeps especially 
designed for military purposes off its list of crime control equipment, thereby permitting a [3 
million dollar] export of these vehicles to the Guatemalan army.”   
 The Reagan administration recast itself as an ally to the government of Guatemala, with 
the U.S. Congress representing an impediment to warmer relations between the two governments 
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that both the Reagan administration and the government of Guatemala needed to confront.  
While it is unclear the degree to which the Reagan administration had genuine concern for the 
human rights situation in Guatemala, the administration was certainly aware that human rights 
improvement would ease administration efforts to aid the Guatemalan government more 
aggressively.  In General Walters meeting with President Lucas, Walters paraphrases his 
explanation of this issue to Lucas,  
We cannot explain to the Congress the drastic increase in deaths in recent months 
of noncombatants not directly involved in the guerrilla [insurrection].  We have 
been unable to demonstrate to Congress that there has been an improvement by a 
reduction in the number of quote bystanders unquote killed by violent action and 
we do not have indications of this…We have to convince Congress that you are 
making an effort to control this generalized violence.72   
 
Walters later assured President Lucas that he would appreciate whatever information the 
President and Foreign Minister could provide to help him to convince Congress that the 
Guatemalan government was making efforts to curtail violence.   
 Thus, similar to the Carter administration, the Reagan administration developed a largely 
adversarial relationship with the U.S. Congress when it came to U.S.-Central American foreign 
relations.  Congressional disapproval constrained the Reagan administration.  The Reagan 
administration abstained from granting the Guatemalan government a $70 million hydro-electric 
loan.  The administration noted to the Guatemalan government that it had abstained because an 
abstention would leave open the possibility that the loan would be approved and a vote in 
support of the loan would have led to Congressional hearings on Guatemala that may have lead 
to nation-specific legislation that would further handicap the Reagan administration's ability to 
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aid the Guatemalan government.73  The Reagan administration did not simply worry that support 
for such a loan would lead to harsher restrictions on Guatemala; the administration also feared 
that Congress would clamp down on military aid to El Salvador, a country that faced similar 
insurgency.74 
 While at home, the Reagan administration attempted to counter Congressional restraints 
on its power, abroad, the Reagan administration faced resistance from human rights 
organizations that criticized Reagan for supporting the Guatemalan government.  Reagan 
discounted such criticisms, holding that such human rights organizations were, like portions of 
Congress, conspiring against the Guatemalan government.  Ambassador Chapin wrote on 
October 22, 1982, that "a concerted disinformation campaign is being waged in the U.S. against 
the Guatemalan government by groups supporting the communist insurgency in Guatemala."75 
The memo went on to say that these groups are "betting on an application, or rather 
misapplication of human rights policy so as to damage the [Government of Guatemala] and assist 
themselves."  Thus, in the administration’s efforts to compel the U.S. Congress to re-instate 
military aid to the Guatemalan government, the administration worked to debunk human rights 
reports that were critical of the Guatemalan government before Congressional committees and 
the public.76   
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DEFENDING THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
  
While the Reagan administration attempted to work around Congressional restraints on 
its power to restore America's traditional military and economic ties to Guatemala, it also 
conducted a rhetorical campaign to defend the government of Guatemala. In a meeting with 
Guatemalan President Lucas, General Vernon Walters assured the president that the Reagan 
administration “sought to insure that the situation in Guatemala is treated in an unbiased and 
objective manner in meetings of international organizations.  For example, in cooperation with 
your delegation, we were successful in obtaining a more acceptable resolution at the recent 
United Nations Human Rights Commission Session in Geneva.”77  In 1981, the Reagan 
administration went on to say that it would silence critics of the Guatemalan government, or 
“minimize public statements by U.S. officials on the human rights situation in Guatemala or on 
any other subject concerning Guatemala about which there is little positive to be said.”78 
 The Reagan administration also lavished praise on Guatemalan leaders and attempted to 
counter international organizations that painted those leaders in a negative light.  During the 
early 1980s, Reagan lavished praise on then Guatemalan President Efraín Ríos  Montt.  Montt 
was “a man of great personal integrity” that was “totally dedicated to democracy.”79  As for 
those contending that Montt was a vicious dictator, they were incorrect; Montt and his 
government had gotten a “bum rap.”80 
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REAGAN’S GUATEMALA POLICY: INCONSISTENT WITH THE TRUTH 
  
 Reagan's characterization of Montt stood in stark contrast to the characterization of Montt 
by three Congressional staffers who visited the president following his successful coup in 1982.  
Those staffers, who met with the new Guatemalan president on March 23, 1982, left their dinner 
with Montt concerned that the Guatemalans had lost one ruthless dictator and gained another.  A 
memorandum composed by Ambassador Chapin concluded,  
[The staffers] were very put off by [Montt’s] failure to even [acknowledge] that 
President Lucas and some of the military had been responsible for human rights 
violations during the Lucas Presidency…Ríos Montt’s failure to commit himself 
to the prosecution of both civilian and military law breakers of the previous 
regime did not sit well.  The Staffdel felt he would be protective of his military 
colleagues even if they might have blood on their hands.81    
 
Besides these concerns, staffers referred to Montt as “crazy” and a “lunatic” whose “feet were 
not on the ground.”82  Ambassador Chapin emphasized in his memorandum that Montt’s 
ramblings could not be blamed on intoxication as only papaya juice was served.83   
 Early indications verified that the Congressional staffers’ views of Montt as one who 
would not uphold a high standard of human rights were correct.  On July 1st, Montt declared a 
state of siege that significantly upped government repression tactics.  Nevertheless, the Reagan 
administration remained firmly committed to the belief that the Guatemalan government was 
improving with regard to human rights violations.  
 While the Reagan administration asserted that most of the human rights violations were 
being committed by the leftist guerrillas, some in the American Embassy in Guatemala were 
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questioning such claims about what was occurring on the ground in Guatemala.  Their 
knowledge was largely skewed by the American Embassy’s method of gathering information.  In 
a memorandum regarding the “Credibility of Embassy Guatemala Human Rights Reporting,” 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Charles Fairbanks concluded that much of 
the Reagan administration's knowledge about human rights in Guatemala came from the 
Guatemalan army, which clearly stood to gain from covering up human rights violations and had 
a history of deception.84  Second, the Embassy relied upon the Guatemalan Press.  While this 
might seem like a good source of relatively unbiased information, the state of siege declared in 
Guatemala in July of 1982 required that all press reports come from army press releases and even 
before the state of siege, Fairbanks admitted that the media is an unreliable source of 
information.85  Fairbanks discussed another source of Embassy information, video tapes and 
transcripts, which he also distrusted because the "early optimistic cables about Choatulum were 
partly based on TV interviews of refugees who said they were fleeing from the guerrillas…A 
later cable, as we know, established that they were fleeing from the Army.”86  Of course, there is 
one reliable means by which to extract information on human rights violations: by asking 
eyewitnesses.  Fairbanks pontificates on this method: 
[On-site inspections and interviews with eye witnesses] are the only really good 
methods of being sure of who is responsible for human rights violations in the 
Guatemalan countryside, although they are far from infallible.  We have not done 
very many such inspections.  I was directly asked by Chuck Berk exactly how 
many on-site inspections Embassy Guatemala has carried out.  I don’t know the 
answer, but suspect it might be embarrassing.87  
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From this, Fairbanks concludes that the American embassy in Guatemala City could not 
accurately state who is responsible for the killings in rural Guatemala; Fairbanks characterized 
the Embassy’s feeling that guerrillas were committing most of the human rights violations as 
“wishful thinking.”88   
 Consequently, the Reagan administration’s defense of the Guatemalan government as a 
government eager to right the wrongs of the past and improve its human rights record did not 
match with independent organizations like the IACHR that visited Guatemala throughout the 
course of the 1980s.  The IACHR traveled to Guatemala to compile special reports of the 
Guatemalan human rights situation in 1981, 1983 and 1985.  The striking trait of all of these 
reports is the consistency across different Guatemalan Presidential administrations of a lack of 
commitment to basic human rights.  In 1981, the IACHR criticized the Lucas government and 
noted that an “alarming climate of violence [had] prevailed in recent years in Guatemala, which 
violence has either been instigated or tolerated by the Government, unwilling or unable to 
contain it.  The violence has resulted in an excessive loss of life and in a widespread 
deterioration of the human rights set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights.”89  In 
1983, the IACHR criticized Montt, noting that, “the Guatemalan army has been principally 
responsible for the most grievous violations of human rights, including destruction, burning and 
sacking of entire towns and the death of both combatant and noncombatant populations in those 
towns.”90  In 1985, too, the Óscar Humberto Mejía Victores government came under fire for its 
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incessant violations of international human rights norms.    
 
CONCLUSIONS ON REAGAN’S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY  
Upon taking office in 1981, officials in the Reagan administration renounced Carter's 
human rights policy on a number of levels.  Reagan officials correctly criticized that Carter's 
policy alienated American allies.  Officials also criticized that Carter's policy aided leftist 
insurgency in Nicaragua and Guatemala and enabled the Sandinistas to win control of the 
Nicaraguan government in 1979.  Ultimately, as John Murphy would criticize in 1978, Carter's 
human rights policy led to a foreign policy in which the United States "slapped" its friends and 
"kissed" its enemies. 
 The Reagan administration sought to rectify this tendency by using the human rights 
policy as a weapon against totalitarian Nicaragua and taking a much more passive approach to 
the human rights violations of perceived allies in the anti-Soviet struggle, like Guatemala.  
Consequently, human rights rhetoric became a critical weapon against the Sandinista government 
while human rights ceased to be a major foreign policy emphasis in America's dealings with the 
"authoritarian" government of Guatemala. 
 On the positive end, the Reagan administration, which considered Guatemala a critical 
American partner in Central America, successfully normalized relations with the Guatemalan 
government by ceasing to pressure the government on its human rights abuses.  More negatively, 
Reagan's human rights policy in Central America was unevenly practiced. The Reagan 
administration sometimes undertook deceitful means to whitewash the human rights abuses of 
the Guatemalan government and the Contra rebels, while critiquing the human rights violations 
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of the Sandinistas.  Ultimately, the normalization of relations with Guatemala and the ultimate 
defeat of Sandinistas with the help of the Contra rebels came at a high cost, complicity with 
human rights abuses of the most severe kind.  
 
 In 1981, the transition of presidential power from Carter to Reagan prompted a significant 
shift in human rights policy.  Upon his election, Carter attempted to re-conceptualize American 
foreign policy.  While he never fully strayed from the Anti-Soviet outlook of his predecessors, he 
nevertheless submerged this traditional Cold War impulse to his human rights policy in some 
cases.  In Guatemala and Nicaragua, Carter aggressively confronted anti-communist 
governments that had long been friends of America.  Though he achieved limited success as a 
result of significant resistance from a number of sources, Carter still managed to bring human 
rights to the forefront of international relations.   
Conversely, Reagan held deep reservations about Carter's human rights policy because that 
policy sometimes entailed the American government to confront its allies in the fight against 
Soviet Communism.  Reagan rejected the notion of "slapping" America's friends with pressure to 
maintain a high standard of human rights.  Consequently, Reagan utilized Carter's human rights 
policy selectively.  Like Carter, Reagan aggressively utilized the policy against Nicaragua, who 
he perceived as a Soviet surrogate.  In sharp contrast to Carter, Reagan supported the 
government of Guatemala despite powerful rumblings in the United States and abroad that the 
Guatemalan government was a gross violator of human rights.  While the Reagan administration 
successfully normalized relations with Guatemala and healed the damage that Carter's human 
rights policy did on U.S.-Guatemalan relations, it did so at the high cost of Guatemalan lives. 
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